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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended governing appeals transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of 
Appeals. The final order was entered on September 15, 2008\ Defendants filed the 
notice of appeal on September 29, 20082, which was timely under Utah R. App. 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's discovery rulings and denial of the Appellants' 
Rule 56(f) Motion were an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process? Trial Court's 
discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 
303, f7, 141 P. 3D 629, Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, f 16, 30 P. 3d 436. Denial of a 
Rule 56(f) Motion is for abuse of discretion. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P. 2d 1241, 
1243 (Utah 1994). Constitutional issues, including that of due process are questions of 
law that are reviewed for correctness. In re KM., 965 P. 2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). These issues were raised by filing Motions to Compel and a Rule 56(f) Motion. 
[R. 396, 483,587, 598, 1321, 1410] and, (ii) the Appellants' Rule 59 Motion [R. 2526, 
2534, 2528,2532, 2577]. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking affidavits or portions 
thereof or in the alternative when it denied the pro-se Defendants "newly engaged" 
counsel's oral motion for leave to correct the deficiencies in the pro-se affidavits if any 
existed? Whether the affidavits set forth admissible evidence is a legal question reviewed 
1
 [R. 2936] 
2
 [R. 2938] 
1 
for correctness. Orvis v Johnson, 2008 UT 2,16 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Review of a trial court's denial of a motion to amend pleadings is for abuse of 
discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v.Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). This issue was 
raised by filing objections to the Motions to Strike [R.1914, 1922, 1925, 1933, 1963, 
2028] at oral argument during the Summary Judgment hearing [R. 4301at 106, 107, 108 
lines 1-7, 118 lines 17-25, 119 lines 1-25, 120 lines 1-4] and in connection with the 
Appellants' Rule 59 Motion [R. 2526,2534,2528,2532, 2577]. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking affidavits filed 
concurrently with the responsive memorandum on grounds for lack of timeliness? A trial 
court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v.Cruz-Meza,2003 UT 32 para 8, 76 P. 3d 1165. This issue was preserved by filing 
the affidavits [R. 1753,1771] and, by the Court in accepting; the memoranda [2702] and, 
one of the affidavits as timely [R. 4301pg. 40 lines 22-25, pg. 41 lines 1-3] and, also in 
connection with the Rule 59 Motion [R.2526,2534,2528,2532,2577]. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking affidavits filed after the 
initial response memorandum, where plaintiff had adequate opportunity to respond to the 
statements in the affidavits and no rule prohibited the filing of the affidavits? A trial 
court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32 para 8, 76 P. 3d 1165. This issue was preserved by filing 
the affidavits [R. 1930,1949, 2033, 2073], during oral argument [R.4301 pg. 45 lines 13-
17] and, by the Court in connection with the Rule 59 Motion [R. 4304 pg.46 lines 10-20] 
5. Was summary judgment precluded by material factual disputes concerning 
2 
the nature of the transactions and the parties intent and; by reason that the Court reviewed 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to them rather than 
the Appellants? On review of a grant of summary judgment to a plaintiff, the inquiry is 
"whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law" Thorncock v. Cook 604 P. 2d 934 
(Utah 1979). Review is for correctness affording no deference to the trial court. Ford 
v.American Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70 121. 98 P.3d 540.When considering a 
motion for summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carrier v. 
Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 Tf3, 104 P. 3d 1208. This issue was raised in Opposition to 
;the Motion in Limine [R.1600, 1862], the Motion for Summary Judgment [R.1837], the 
proposed order [R. 2221] and, in connection with the Rule 59 Motion [R. 2526, 2534, 
2528,2532, 2577]. 
6. Whether the trial courts decision to award attorney fee's to the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $113,301.15 was in error and or an abuse of discretion. Review is for 
correctness, patent error or clear abuse of discretion. Keith Jorgensen 's , Inc. v. Ogden 
City Mall Co., 2001 UT App. 128, 1J11, 26 P. 3d 872 This issue was raised by filing an 
objection to the Affidavit for Attorney Fee's [R.2358, 2378, 2350, 2354] during oral 
argument at the 06/30/2008 telephonic hearing [R. 4302] and in connection with the Rule 
59 Motion [R. 2534] 
7. Whether the trial Court abused its discretion when it denied the Defendants 
Rule 59 Motion? Review is for abuse of discretion. Child v. Gonda 972 P. 2d 425 (Utah 
3 
1998). This issue is properly raised on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are set forth 
in the Addendum. - Utah Code §78-36-10.3 and §78-27-56. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 56(e) and (c) and, Utah R. Evid. 613 (b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from an Order granting Plaintiff/Appellee 
Golden Meadows Properties, LC aka Golden Meadows Properties, LLC ("GM") Motion 
for Summary Judgment establishing ownership of the Property in favor of GM for the 
purpose of evicting Defendant/Appellant Michael Strand ("Strand") from his home of 32 
years and Defendant/Appellant Cari Allen ("Allen") from her home of 15 years and an 
award of damages to GM in the amount of $39,600 for unlawful detainer and attorney's 
fee's and expenses on all aspects of this case in the amount of $113,301.15 under Utah 
Code §78-36-10.3. 
Strand purchased the property in 1976, possessed it ever since and continuously 
claimed ownership of the home. Strand had allowed the home to be titled in the name of 
GM and it's predecessors in interest in reliance on Neuman Petty's (the manager of 
Nupetco Associates, the sole member and manager of GM) promises and assurances to 
Mr. Strand that it was being held in trust for his benefit. Although attorney's fees were 
Awarded to GM for defending against the Appellants' Counterclaim, no bad faith 
3
 By reason of the fact that the Court found that the pleadings, affidavits (as narrowed by 
the Order Concerning Motions to Strike [Appellants] affidavits) and other papers 
submitted to the Court do not raise a genuine issue of material fact [2703^2]. 
4 
was found on the part of the Appellants pursuant to §78-27-56. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The record on Appeal contains 
approximately 305 entries and is just shy of 3,000 pages of documents, excluding the 
transcripts. Therefore this statement presents a general overview. 
GM filed its Complaint in this matter on August 30, 2007 seeking relief under the 
unlawful detainer act [R. 1]. The Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim on 
September 10, 2007 that alleged causes of action titled (1) "Bad Faith," (2) "Quiet Title 
Action," (3) "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," and (4) "Breach of Constructive Trust" [R. 20, 
39]. GM filed its reply to the Counterclaim on October 1, 2007 [R. 94]. 
At a hearing held on October 24, 2007, the Court entered into technical legal 
dialog with GM counsel and set an expedited "prospective" Scheduling Order under the 
unlawful detainer act [R. 4299]. 
On October 31, 2007 GM filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and 
To Impose Sanctions and on November 28, 2007, the Court overruled the Appellants 
objections and granted that Motion4. Thereafter, GM conducted three days of 
Depositions. 2.5 of which it conducted upon Strand. Even though Allen requested on 
behalf of herself and Strand at the outset of the depositions that they be sent the originals 
for review, signatures and changes if necessary, they were not made available to the 
Appellants [R. 593 f6]. The depositions were not fully admitted before the Court [R. 620-
650, 672-680, 2189-2184] and the transcripts were sealed by GM counsel and would not 
be released, even for review, without paying the Court reporter and video fees in an 
4[R. 198,200,229,266, 358, 364, 372, 375, 378, 380,388,390] 
5 
amount of $5,264 [R. 2272]. 
On January 8, 2008 the Appellants filed Motions to Compel Answers to 
Interrogatories and Production of Documents along with requests for Suspension of the 
Court's Scheduling Order. GM moved to strike both Motions and also filed Memoranda 
in Opposition5 
On January 16, 2008, GM filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with six 
accompanying affidavits6 and on January 29 the Appellants filed a pleading titled 
"Motion for Stay and Motion to Enlarge time to Respond to Motion for Summary 
Judgment." The Motion sought relief under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure . 
GM filed a Motion in Limine to exclude evidence relating to the Appellants' 
defenses and Counterclaim dated Jan. 31, 2008 [R. 1180,1192,1559,1562,1600,2051]. 
The proposed Pre-Trial Order was due on Monday February 11, 2008 and was not 
served on the Appellants for review and comment until Friday Feb. 8 at 3:30 p.m. The 
Appellants filed an objection and again moved the Court to alter its Scheduling Order 
[R.1521]. 
At the hearing held on February 13,2008, the Court took argument from Allen and 
from GM counsel and thereafter, denied the Appellants Motions to Compel and their 
Rule 56(f) motion as an abuse of the discovery process. When Strand tried to address the 
5
 [R. 396,483, 583, 587, 594, 598, 1126,1130, 1141, 1145,1154,1321,1410, 1467] 
6
 [R. 601, 705, 860, 907, 929, 965, 969,993, 1124, 1128] 
7[R.1162,1166, 1183, 1477, 1495,1556] 
6 
Court, Judge Dawson abruptly left the Bench [R. 4300]. By its ruling, the Court 
effectively denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to include indispensable 
party or to join Nupetco Associates, Neuman Petty, Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty as 
parties' plaintiff that was filed on Feb. 13 prior to the hearing [R. 1548, 1550]. The Court 
indicated that the pre-trial order was to be filed with the court by February 19, 2008 
(within 4 business days) and that the Appellants failure to cooperate could result in a 
striking of their answers and a default judgment being entered. Off the record the Court 
indicated that the Appellants would have until Wednesday February 20, 2008 to respond 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 1548,1911,2048,4300]. 
When the parties were unable to agree on the content of the pre-trial order by the 
close of February 19, 2008 each party submitted their own proposed order [R. 1567, 
2157,2140]. 
The Appellants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment along with a Countermotion and submitted ten accompanying Affidavits. Six 
of the Affidavits were served on February 20. Based on stipulation by the parties the 
Appellants responsive memorandum and the rest of the affidavits were served on 
February 228. GM moved to strike significant portions or virtually all of the Affidavits 
Appellants submitted, along with motions to reduce time and for expedited hearing. In 
response to the Motions to Strike the Appellants also submitted supplemental affidavits 
and the Affidavits of Charles Dooley and attorney Daniel Jackson. GM moved to Strike 
8[R- 1837, (1852, 1860, 1862), 1605, 1673, 1753, 1771, 1810, 1813, 1817, 1828, 1831, 
1834,2057,2060] 
7 
these affidavits as well9. 
The Appellants had represented themselves pro-se, but obtained pro-bono counsel 
to represent them at the Summary Judgment hearing after the Court threatened to strike 
their Answers and enter a default judgment against them and GM moved to strike their 
affidavits on grounds that they were procedurally deficient [R. 2042,4301 pg. 71 lines 1-21]. 
GM filed its response in support of its motion for summary judgment on February 
28 and submitted its pro-posed order granting the motion. The Court held a hearing on 
GM's Motion for Summary Judgment and its various Motions to Strike Monday March 
3, 2008. The hearing was continued to and concluded on Wednesday, 03/05/2008 [R. 
1975, 2001, 4301]. The Court denied the Appellants' Countermotion because it was not 
filed within the January 15 deadline set for the Court for filing motions. The Court struck 
significant portions or virtually all of the Appellants supporting Affidavits and granted 
GM Motion for Summary Judgment. Before the Court so ruled the Appellant's "newly 
engaged counsel" requested that the Court liberally construe the pro-se Appellants' 
pleadings and affidavits and made an oral motion for leave to correct the deficiencies in 
the Affidavits if any existed and to amend to the Counterclaim to clarify the adverse 
possession and constructive trust claims [R. 4301 Tr. pg. 106, 107 and 108 lines 1-7, 118 
lines 17-25, 119 lines 1-25, 120 line 1-4]. By its rulings on Golden Meadow's Motions to 
Strike and on its Motion for Summary Judgment the Court effectively denied those 
9
 [R. 1568,1570,1576,1579, 1581,1595,1597, 1864,1866,1871,1873, 1879,1881,1886, 
1888, 1897, 1899, 1902, 1914, 1922, 1925, 1933, 1949, 1963, 2002, 2005, 2024, 2028, 
2033, 2066, 2068, 2073] 
8 
requests 
The Appellants filed a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and Motion to Amend the 
Judgment for Irregularities in the Proceeding which Prevented them from Having a Fair 
Trial [R. 2526-2534]. GM opposed the motion by memorandum filed on June 9, 2008 [R. 
2569]. The Appellants response was filed on June 18, 2009 [R. 2569, 2620, 2695] and 
was supplemented with additional documents that substantiated the Appellants' 
argument. Even though these documents (as reflected in the Addendum) were filed with 
the Clerk they do not appear on the record and at the telephonic hearing held on 
September 3, 2008, the Court instructed the Appellant's counsel to pick them up or they 
would be destroyed11. The Court entered the Order denying the Appellants Rule 59 
Motion on September 15, 2008 and on September, 29, 2008; the Appellants filed the 
Notice of Appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. This statement presents a general overview of the 
background facts necessary to understand this case and the arguments contained in this 
brief. This appeal asserts the facts were disputed, so those facts are discussed in more 
detail in the argument section of this brief. 
1. Nupetco Associates ("Nupetco') is the sole member and manager of GM 
and is owned and controlled by Neuman Petty and his family including two of his sons; 
10
 [R. 2199, 2210,2213, 2217,2221,2280, 2290,2477, 2702]. 
" [R. Tr. 4304 pg. 2 lines 4-25, pg. 3 lines 1-25, pg. 4 lines 1-25, pg. 5 lines 1-25, pg. 6 
lines 1-25, pg. 7 lines 1-25, pg. 8 lines 1-5 (2891,2927)]. 
9 
attorney Wayne Petty and attorney Ralph Petty [R. 596 Answer to Interrogatory No. 19]. 
2. Strand purchased the Property in 1976 [R. 1838 at [^2] and during the 
1980's Strand and his entities (including B.I. Associates) and Neuman Petty ("Petty") 
and his entities (including Nupetco) executed an agreement (the Joint Venture 
"Agreement") for an oil drilling and production venture in the Overland Dome Filed, 
Wyoming [R. 603 ^5, 650, 2704]. In this regard Petty's contribution was approximately 
$750,000 that was comprised of $309,000 debt owed them by Strand and the amount 
required to pay off the mortgages to three properties: Strands Bountiful home, "the 
Property," Strand's parents home, "the Pages Lane Property," and Strands parents rental 
property, "the Dexter Street Property," [R. 287-288 fflf's 14"16] and t 0 n o l d m ese 
properties in trust for the Strands until such time as Petty's investment, as per the Nov. 
16, 1982 "Agreement," was recouped [R. 486]. Strands contribution was $3,000,000 in 
claims and production equipment worth $3,200,000. Legal counsel to Strand and Petty 
were attorney's Wayne Petty and Daniel Jackson [See Addendum at 2 and R. 2073-2076]. 
3. In furtherance of their ongoing business arrangement, Strand and Petty 
engaged in a course of business dealings under which Strand would assign his assets to 
Petty and Petty would provide Strand with money to conduct his business affairs and 
cover his personal living expenses [R. 2075 «|8, 289-290 fflfs 30-31]. Following such 
assignments, Strand would continue to retain control of the underlying asset for the 
benefit of himself and Petty but, relied on Petty to make business decisions for their best 
interests [R. 2075 ^9, Strand Depo. R. 2192 pg. 476 lines 16-25, and 2193 pg. 477 lines 1-25]. 
10 
4. In consideration of the various assignments, transfers and conveyances of 
personal property given by Strand to Petty and, consistent with the consideration 
promised by Petty to Strand in the 1982 agreement, Petty acquired Strand's home (the 
"Property") in the name of Nupetco on September 5, 1985 from the Citizen's Bank 
purported foreclosure sale for the benefit of Strand. Strand was fine with that 
arrangement. The actions of Petty and Strand were directed at maximizing the value of 
Strand's assets for the purpose of benefiting both Strand and Petty12. 
5. In 1997, five years after Allen met and moved in with Strand [R. 1754 f7 
(first line) and 1756 [^17 (first sentence)] and while Strand was still in Federal Custody 
(Half-way house), Petty explained to Strand and Allen that he wanted to put the home 
back in Strands name but that he (Petty) needed to raise some money for one of his 
projects. Petty wanted Strand to get a mortgage loan and show Strand buying the home 
from Nupetco so that he (Petty) would get the money he was seeking. Petty told Strand 
and Allen that he would make all the payments on a loan if Strand could obtain one [R 
19311J3]. Thereafter, Petty, through his title company named LandMark Title, cleared the 
exceptions on the chain of title, particularly, the fictitious Assumption of the Senior Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note held by Equitable Life & Casualty that Petty had filed with 
Davis County Recorders Office on August 27, 1990, as an Agreement [R. 1688, 1686, 
12
 [R. 2075-2076H's 14-16 and 118, 1775 I f s 17-19, Strands Depo. at 103 lines 24-25 
[R. 626], 106 lines 8-25 [R. 627], 108 lines 12-25 [R. 628], 109 lines 1-2 [R. 629], 120 
lines 13-15 [R. 630], 122 lines 1-25 [R. 632],123 lines 1-25 [R. 633], 124 lines 1-4 [R. 
634], 126 lines 8-25 [R. 636], 127 lines 1-25 [R. 637], 128 lines 1-25 [R. 638] and, 129 
lines 1-25 [R. 639]. 
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1687, 1685]. Petty also worked with a mortgage company ("Is Choice Mortgage") in an 
effort to consummate a loan for Strand. Ultimately the mortgage company aborted the 
transaction due to irregularities [R. 2033; 1686, 1687, 1685]. When the transaction 
failed, as per instructions from Strand, LandMark Title who was facilitating the proposed 
transaction returned the down payment that Petty had deposited with them, back to Petty 
[R. Strand 1951-1952^3 and Allen 19311J4]. 
6. On 07/21/2000, for the stated purpose of augmenting the return of the 
Property to Strands name, and, under the auspices of LandMark Title, Nupetco conveyed 
Strand's home to Allen's brand new company named Log Furniture, Inc. ("LFI") by way 
of a fictitious Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract after Allen for LFI and Petty as the 
manager of Nupetco signed a "Disclaimer" holding LandMark Title harmless [R. 691, 
1684]. The Real Estate Purchase contract that was signed by Allen for LFI and Petty as 
the manager of Nupetco states that Nupetco sold the home to LFI for $390,000 and that 
there was no loan or financing involved [R. 561-566, 681-686, 1702-1707]. The 
$390,000 cashiers check that financed the transaction was purchased by Nupetco with 
Nupetco's funds [See top of R. 1331 (circled in blue)]. In spite of these facts, and also 
under the auspices of LandMark Title, Petty also caused Allen to sign a fictitious 
promissory Note and Deed of Trust on the Property in favor of GM securing the Note 
with the property. Petty signed this second set of documents as the manager of GM and 
caused the bank to label the $390,000 cashiers check to state on its face that it was 
purchased by GM, rather than the true purchaser, Nupetco [R.704 (compare with 1331)]. 
As part of this transaction, Petty also caused Allen sign a personal guarantee and took 
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ownership of 100% of the issued and outstanding stock of LFI [R. 687-690,736-737]. 
7. When Strand found out about the 07/21/2000 transaction, and that Petty 
had promised and assured Allen that (i) the transaction was only temporary and that it 
was something he had to do for "Uncle Sam" (ii) that Strand had okayed it (iii) that there 
would be no financial obligation on LFFs or Allen's part whatsoever (iv) that the 
transaction was a way of getting the house back in Strands name and; (v) that Petty and 
his son, attorney Ralph Petty had expected Strand to sign the guarantee along with Allen, 
Strand called Petty immediately on his speaker phone in Allen's presence and asked 
Petty what he was doing. Petty also promised and assured Strand that (i) the transaction 
was only temporary and that it was something he had to do for "Uncle Sam" (ii) that 
there would be no financial obligation on LFFs or Allen's part whatsoever and; (iii) that 
the transaction was a way of getting the house back in Strands name [R. 1777 -1778 127, 
28, R. 1754-1755 H's 4-14, 5Pff s 7, 8]. 
8. Despite having prior knowledge of Strands claim of ownership to the 
Property, one of LFFs creditors ("MHS") executed against the Property in September 
2003 and purchased LFFs alleged interest for $5,000. MHS did not challenge Strand's 
occupancy or ownership of the home and, for the benefit of Strand and Petty [R. 1843 
121, 1778 129, 1756 118 (last sentence) and 119], GM, represented by attorney Ralph 
Petty (as trustee), utilized the fictitious Note and Deed of Trust to hold a foreclosure sale 
on October 31,2003 in an effort to clear title of LFI and its creditor. The Green Affidavit 
filed by GM in support of its motion for summary judgment states vesting in GM to be 
November 19, 2003, the date that Ralph Petty filed the Trustee's Deed [R. 996 115 (last 
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line)].The check that paid for the fee's involved in that foreclosure sale came from 
Nupetco signed by Neuman Petty to Ralph Petty (as trustee) with a notation on the memo 
that it was charged to Strand [R. Trustee's Deed 1855-1858, Check 1859 (1361, 1362-
1367)]. 
9. Strand and Petty continued to act as co-partners until July 15, 2005 when 
Petty repudiated the joint venture [R. 295-296 ffl['s 63-72]. On October 3, 2005 Petty 
sent a letter to Strand that stated that Petty owned the oil field and everything in it was his 
including; four producing wells, Strands 3.2 million dollars worth of production 
equipment and the proceeds from the sale of oil and the sale of surplus equipment. Petty 
also stated that: 
"As to the other matters raised in your letters, and others not mentioned (for 
example, Log Furniture and the Bountiful house), I am completing my review and 
will be prepared to discuss them with you soon. I will advise you when I am 
prepared to talk about them or I will advise you in writing of my position." [R. 
2606] 
10. Strand obtained legal counsel13 and entered into settlement negotiations 
with Petty through his two attorney sons, Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty. During the 
negotiations, Strand's counsel discussed the issues [R. 2379 [^ 3] and supplied the Petty's 
a draft copy of Strand's proposed complaint against Petty and Nupetco [Tr. R. 270 (last 
paragraph) - 271]. The Complaint alleged each parties contribution and causes of action 
titled "Breach of Joint Venture Agreement," "Fraud," Negligent Misrepresentation," 
"Breach of Fiduciary Duty," "Conversion," "Unjust Enrichment," and, "Accounting" [R. 
13
 Justice D. Frank Wilkins of Berman & Savage until his untimely death in 2006 and 
Sidney Baucom, Andrew Stone and Mark Tolman of Jones Waldo Holbrook & 
McDonough. 
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285-311]. The Petty's retained outside counsel, attorney James Swindler and, joined GM 
as a party to the negotiations [R.554]. On July 12, 2007, Strand's counsel supplied Mr. 
Swindler copies of Strands personal and legal documents from the early 1980's through 
the present [R. 190-191 and 2379 ^4]. Thereafter, Petty and his counsel failed and refused 
to provide their documents [R. 4299 pg. lines 3-11] and, the requested accounting for 
the income received by Petty and his entities from the oil produced in the Overland Dome 
Field and for revenues received by Petty and his entities from the assets assigned to them 
by Strand [R. 296 f f s 70-72]. 
11. On August 15, 2007 Allen discovered case no. 040700433 (GM v. Cari 
Allen) and moved to set aside (i) the May 10, 2004 foreclosure sale that GM alleged it 
also conducted against the property and (ii) the almost half a million dollar default 
judgment that Petty and his attorney son Ralph had taken against her for an alleged 
deficiency on the fictitious LFI Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note that they alleged that 
Allen owed. Thereafter, on August 23, 2007, GM served a five day "Notice to Quit" on 
each of the Appellants that declared that they were tenants at will occupying "the 
Property" (Strand's home of 32 years) at the pleasure of GM and demanded that Strand 
and Allen vacate the house and leave the furniture and personal property that belonged to 
Nupetco Associates, despite the fact that it was GM serving the Notice to Quit, and 
Nupetco was not listed as party plaintiff [R. 4, 654-655, 656-657]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants argue that they were prejudiced by not being given the right to 
due process and precluded from discovering and presenting facts relevant to the subject 
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matter involved in the pending action and to determine GM's standing and Judge Dawons 
subject matter jurisdiction. That the material facts were disputed. By not receiving the 
Affidavits and or the Affidavit testimony submitted by the Appellants' in opposition to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment the Court failed to determine the existence of issues 
of fact. The attorney fees were unreasonable, an action to quiet title does not provide for 
attorneys fees under §78-36-10.3 and, there was not attempt to apportion. And, lastly, that 
the Summary Judgment ruling is irregular to the extent that the Court ruled on issues 
when the Appellants were not given any ability to present relevant information. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANTS WERE PREJUDICED BY NOT BEING GIVEN THEIR 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND PRECLUDED FROM DISCOVERING AND 
PRESENTING FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER INVOLVED 
IN THE PENDING ACTION. 
"[Sjtanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied before a court 
may entertain a controversy between two parties. Under the traditional test for standing, 
the interests of the parties must be adverse and the parties seeking relief must have a 
legally protectible interest in the controversy." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, f 12, 154 P. 
3d 808. GM was able to evade this requirement and the merits of the case by changing its 
theories, by withholding crucial information and by hiding behind Neuman Petty and his 
corporate entities. For Example; A decree quieting title cannot be entered in an unlawful 
detainer action. Thomson v. Reynolds 53 Utah 437, 174 P. 164 (Utah 1918). Title to the 
land is not involved in the unlawful detainer action. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 173 
P. 245 (1918) and, it is not the purpose of an eviction action to try title to the land 
Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304,237 P. 217. Under principles of standing, a party may 
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generally assert his or her own rights, and cannot raise the claims of third parties who are 
not before the court. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P. 3d 735 (Utah 2004). 
The records show that the home was titled in Strand's name from 1976 through 
September 5, 1985 [R. 1680 at [^2] and thereafter from September 5, 1985 through 
07/21/2000 was titled in Nupetco's name [R. 1631 at f l l first sentence], In spite of these 
facts, GM filed its Complaint in this matter under the unlawful detainer act alleging that 
GM acquired ownership of the Property prior to 07/21/2000 [R.lat ^4], 
The Real Estate Purchase contract that was signed by Allen for LFI and Petty as 
the manager of Nupetco states that Nupetco sold the home to LFI for $390,000 and that 
there was no loan or financing involved [R. 561-566, 681-686, 1702-1707], The 
$390,000 cashiers check that financed the transaction was purchased by Nupetco with 
Nupetco's funds [See top of R. 1331 (circled in blue)]. In spite of these facts; 
i) On November 7, 2007 Neuman Petty testified in Federal Court that: "Log 
Furniture, Cari Allen, Mike Strand wanted to buy a home in Bountiful (the "Property") 
and the home was owned by Nupetco Associates, We agreed upon a price and details. 
And in order to effect a tax free exchange, a 1031, Nupetco -well GM loaned Log 
Furniture $390,000, with which they purchased through LandMark Title, a property on 
Federal Heights Drive, and made an exchange with Nupetco for the home in Bountiful" 
[R. 474-477 (476 lines 16-24) 532-534], and, in spite of this admission; 
ii) GM filed its Complaint under the unlawful detainer act alleging that it sold 
the Property (the Bountiful home) to Log Furniture Inc. on 07/21/2000 and that it 
financed the transaction [R. 1 at [^4]. 
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Golden Meadows further alleged that it was obtained the home in 2004 after LFI 
defaulted on its payment of its obligations under the Note [R. 2 at f 5]. Despite this 
contention, as referenced in the statement of facts above, these facts are disputed and, are 
the subject matter of case no. 040700433 pending before Judge Memmott to determine 
through GM's claims what, if any, deficiency is owed by Allen following the alleged 
May 10, 2004 foreclosure sale; and to determine through Allen's counterclaims, whether 
the foreclosure sale was lawful ab initio, and whether GM has standing and title to the 
property that is the subject of this action [R. 1179 Tf4 and 2782-2784.] These issues would 
have been litigated in 2004 had Petty and his son attorney Ralph Petty not concealed this 
action and the almost half a million dollar default judgment they took against Allen, from 
the Appellants for three years [R. 44 f f s 12,14,325-332,2543] 
In Reply to the Appellants' Counterclaim, GM alleged that GM paid the taxes at 
all times since it first acquired title to the property, that Nupetco paid all taxes for at least 
three additional years prior to GM's acquisition, that Nupetco acquired title as a bone fide 
purchaser, and that the Counterclaim is barred by reason of failure of the consideration 
promised by Strand to Neuman Petty in the alleged 1982 agreement [R. 94-99]. 
Later, at the hearing held on October 24, 2007, GM alleged that Mr. Neuman Petty 
obtained legal title to the property during the 1980's and received virtually nothing over 
the last 20 years for his investment and because of the impending litigation14, the decision 
was made to file this action for him (Neuman Petty) to get the benefit of the property [R. 
14
 (Strand et al., v. Petty et al. case no 070915796, that is inclusive of all the issues [R. 
285-311 Contributions; Petty's 287-288 f 14-16 and Strand's R. 2881J18-19 / See also: 
505-511]) 
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4299 Tr. pg. 24 lines 7-1]. Contrary to this assertion, the evidence before the Court: was 
that Strand had satisfied his contribution and that Petty had received all of the monies due 
tiim under the joint venture and owed Strand no less than $11,000,000 and the deeds to 
Strands home, Strands parents' home and their rental properties [R. 71-81]. 
GM's last assertion that Nupetco purchased the property in 1985 at the Citizen's 
Bank foreclosure sale with its own funds for its own benefit, that Nupetco allowed the 
Strand's to occupy the Property pursuant to a lease and then at 'the will of, with 
permission from Nupetco, on 7/21/2000 Nupetco conveyed the property to LFI through a 
transaction that GM financed, that GM paid the taxes from 2000 through 2007 with its 
own funds and, that GM obtained ownership of the home in 2004 after Log Furniture 
defaulted on its payments [R.603-606 fflf's 6-8,11,18-20], places facts surrounding the 
joint venture and GM's various theories, facts surrounding the transactions and the 
parties intent at issue and should have determined this was not an eviction case entitled to 
expedited treatment, particularly in view of Appellants' Counterclaim. 
There were fact questions as to the source of funds used in the transactions, for 
payment of the taxes and, whether GM was an alter ego of Neuman Petty or its parent 
corporation, as would allow piercing of corporate veil, precluding summary judgment 
particularly when GM, Petty, and Nupetco displayed such a blatant unity of interest, 
ownership and co-mingling of funds that the separate personalities of the corporations 
and the individual no longer exists. It was clearly improper" for the Trial Court: to deny 
the Appellants' discovery motions seeking information about the source of funds used; 
(i) to purchase the Property at the Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale and allow GM to 
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litigate claims of Nupetco (i) in the 07/21/2000 transaction and allow GM to base its 
standing to evict Strand of his home of 32 years based solely upon the un verified 
statements by GM's counsel that Nupetco loaned GM the funds used in the 07/21/2000 
transaction [R. 4300 Tr. pg. 10 lines 14- 22, 2049 ] and, writings created at the insistence 
of Petty [R. 604-605 Hfs 11, 13, 14, 15,16 and 1754-1757 Iff s 4-24, 17711ff's29-30], 
and; (iii) for payment of the taxes and allow GM rely on checks that Petty produced as 
evidence to Strand and his attorney John Caine in 2004 [R. 2551-2552], that GM was 
paying the taxes with Strand's money at Strand's instructions - particularly in view of the 
fact that GM's deposits for 2002 (the only year produced) demonstrates that it's only 
source of funds comes from Nupetco [R.1333] and, GM did not offer any documentation 
to support Petty's testimony that GM reimbursed Nupetco for its payment in 2006. 
GM did not comply with the 20 days imposed by the Scheduling Order nor the 
December 21, 2007 cut off date for production of documents [R. 1130 %L and 2260 -
12/26/06 and 12/27/07 entries 593 f 8]. It did not complete its production until January 9, 
2008 [R. 2587]. It produced boxes of un-requested documents that the Appellants did not 
need [R. 591 last line and Footnote 1, R. 1135 2nd paragraph, R. 2354-2356 R. 2378-
2381] and tampered with the records by withdrawing documents after they were sent to 
the printers15. It withheld crucial information16 and simply refused to produce documents 
and answer most of the Interrogatories relating to its standing by quoting Allen's 
15
 GM's counsel testified that it's copying costs were $509 [R 2246 f 15, 2272]. The 
Appellant's invoice states that the printing charges were $478 [R. 2598]. At 16 cents a 
page plus tax, the Appellants were withheld, after they were sent to the printers, exactly 
to the penny, 362 pages of documents that the Appellants had marked for production. 
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testimony in matters unrelated to the present litigation \R. 534-535]. 
GM withdrew it's Sixteenth Defense that the Counterclaim is barred by reason of 
failure of the consideration promised by Strand to Petty in the alleged 1982 agreement 
[R. 542-543] and refused to produce documents or answer most of the Interrogatories 
relating to the Appellant's claims and defenses and GM's various theories by stating 
through i t s agent, Neuman Petty, that the Appellants' requests were irrelevant, that GM 
has no information prior to its' existence in 1995 and that it has no knowledge of Mr. 
Strand's relationship with Neuman Petty and Nupetco [R. 442-464, 530-550]. 
Particularly in view of GM's motion summary judgment that is predicated on this very 
information that it claimed i1 had no knowledge or possession of, that it claimed was 
irrelevant and refused to produce. 
A corporation's knowledge is entirely imputed to it from the knowledge possessed 
by its officers and agents. Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P. 3d 1009 
Utah 2002. The matters recited by GM in its Reply to the Appellants Counterclaim, by 
it's counsel at the October 24, 2007 hearing and by Neuman Petty in support of GM's 
Motion for Summary Judgment concerned knowledge in the possession and control of 
GM that was not exposed in discovery and that there had not been sufficient time since 
the inception of the lawsuit for Appellants to utilize discovery procedures, and thereby 
have an opportunity to cross-examine the moving party. The pleadings had not been 
closed and there were complex legal issues posed, with an inadequate factual basis. 
Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to grant GM's motion The Trial 
As discussed below in Point I. A and B. 
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Court should have ordered a continuance to permit discovery, or denied the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, without prejudice to its renewal, after adequate time had elapsed in 
which Appellants could have obtained the desired information. See Strand v. Associated 
Students of University of Utah 561 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
Mr. Strand suffered a traumatic brain injury in 2004 that has severely hindered his 
attempts to remember facts about his past without the benefit of documents [R 2529 [^2-8, 
2601-2602] and by it's ruling, the Trial Court precluded the Appellants from discovering 
crucial information to aid their position and defense at the initial stages of the case and to 
properly refute GM's Motion for Summary Judgment. If the Court had granted the 
Appellants' Motions to Compel and their request to amend the Court's scheduling order 
to allow for further discovery, depositions and motions and or the Appellants' Rule 56 
(f) Motion the Appellants would have been able to discover material facts that GM and 
Petty sought to conceal that precluded Summary Judgment. For Example; 
A. After the Court's Summary Judgment ruling, the Appellants discovered the 
Citizen's Bank litigation and that it was within the knowledge and possession of GM 
through Petty and his attorney son Wayne Petty who participated in that action and, 
Wayne Petty's Citizen's Bank file but, intentionally withheld from the Appellants [R. 
2260 12/27/07]. This litigation precludes summary judgment and contradicts GM's 
statement of facts at f6 [R. 603], Petty's testimony at Hf's 5, 6 [R. 970]17 and the Trial 
17
 Petty testified the $38,000 was a loan. Strand testified the $38,000 was not a loan but 
in exchange for over $100,000 of Global Stock that was being held by the Citizens Bank 
[R. 1775^15].The litigation supports Strand and Nupetco's standing in the action. 
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Court's conclusion the Nupetco's acquisition of the Property at the Citizens bank 
foreclosure sale in 1985 was a possible wrongful act imparting constructive notice to 
Strand [R. 2711]. The Citizen's Bank foreclosure was an act of extortion [See Addendum 
at 3, Affidavit of Strand at «p2 and Addendum at 4, Second Amended Complaint at ffij's 
36, 37, 38, 46, 62-66]. Strand owed no money to The Citizen's Bank on the date of its 
foreclosure sale [See Addendum at 5 Affidavit of Lohr Livingston at fl and Addendum 
at 4, Second Amended Complaint at f72]. Nupetco's purchase of the Property was not an 
independent purchase by a corporation for it's own benefit, nor a wrongful act, but rather, 
it was an agreed upon transaction by two longstanding business associates (Petty and 
Strand) to protect Strand and his Property from the Citizen's Bank extortion attempt [See 
Addendum 3pg.21,f78]. 
B. The Appellants were also clearly prejudiced by not being given the right to 
discover information about GM's Notice to Quit and about the lease that GM used in 
support of it's Motion [R. 975, 654-657, 656-657]. By denying the Appellants' Motion 
to Compel answer to Interrogatory No. 10 [R. 539-540] and Request for Production of 
documents no. 59, [R. 463] (seeking information about the Notice to Quit (the demand 
for furniture allegedly belonging to Nupetco) and the Appellant's Rule 56(f) Motion 
(seeking information about the lease)) [R. 1495-1519], the Trial Court (Judge Dawson) 
precluded the Appellants from discovering at the initial stages of the case and prior to the 
Court's summary judgment ruling that (i) the source of Nupetco Associates' claim of 
entitlement to Strand's furniture arises from Judge Dawson's, Petty's and Nupetco's 
involvement and participation in a 1989 IRS collection action against Strand (ii) that on 
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04/18/1989 the IRS (represented by then prosecutor and now Judge Dawson) seized the 
identical property that is the subject matter of this eviction action as being Strand's, and 
(iii) that the issue of ownership of the property and the furniture along with the validity 
of the 1985 lease were disputed and rights and possession were determined in favor of 
Strand. The documents involved; (i) The stipulation signed by Judge Dawson as a former 
prosecutor [R. 2975-2976] (ii) Strands letter to Mr. Vano [R. 2978-2979] (iii) Nupetco's 
request for return of wrongfully levied property and Petty's supporting affidavit that 
relied on the same 1985 lease that Golden Meadows submitted in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment purporting it to be valid and binding and without challenge [R. 
2985-2997] along with; (iv) the Subordination agreement entered into by the parties on 
07/18/1989 whereby Strand paid for the release of his property (the furniture and the 
fixtures attached to and belonging to the Property) [R. 2999-3000], contradict the Trial 
Courts Summary Judgment Ruling at R. 2704-2705 and 2708-2712, GM's statements of 
facts ffl's 7 through 9 [R.603-604 ], the Affidavit of Petty at fflf's 7-9 [R. 970] and, the 
Trial Court's conclusion in the Summary Judgment ruling at pg. 3 second to last line, 
that: "Absent the Lease, the residence that is the subject of this action (the "Property") 
would still have belonged to Nupetco Associates ("Nupetco") following the 1985 
trustee's sale and therefore could not have been attached by Strand's creditors."[R. 2704] 
There are significant unresolved issues of material fact. Consequently, GM was 
not entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. Where one party wrongfully 
denies another the evidence necessary to establish a fact in dispute, the court must draw 
the strongest allowable inferences in favor of the aggrieved party." {National Associates 
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ojRadiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, N.S. Cal. 1987). Therefore, summary 
j udgment should also be reversed. 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING AFFIDAVITS OR PORTIONS 
THEREOF OR; IN THE ALTERNATIVE; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 
IT DID NOT GRANT MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THEM. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's order striking the Feb 20, Feb 22 and 
Feb 28 Affidavits or portions thereof for failure to conform to Rule 56(e) or Rule 702 
[R.2213-2217]. "A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a 
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers18." "District Courts must 
take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the 
complex procedural issues involved in summary judgment proceedings19", including the 
opportunity to resubmit affidavits to conform with Fed. R. Civ. P. R. 56(e) See Jaxon, 
III f. 2d at 1140 (reversing summary judgment where district court refused to permit pro 
se litigant to resubmit affidavits to conform with Rule 56(e))." 
By not receiving the Affidavits and or Affidavit testimony submitted by the 
Appellants and others in opposition to GM's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial 
Court failed to determine the existence of issues of fact. As discussed herein, the 
Appellants disputed each of the key facts raised by GM, therefore the Court erred when it 
did not liberally construe the Appellants' pleadings and affidavits or grant meaningful 
18
 Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594 30 L. d 2d 652 (1972); See also 
Hallv. Bellmon,. 935 F. 2d 1106. 110 (10th Cir. 1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
106, 97S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1971) Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F. 2d 935 ' 
938(10*^ .1989) . 
19
 Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 113 F. 2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir 1985) (quoting Garaux v. 
Pulley, 739 F. 2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984); See also Hall, 935 F. 2d at 1110 n. 3 
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opportunity to correct them. Even if there were some conclusory statements in the 
affidavits, those statements did not prejudice GM and did not justify striking the 
admissible statements. See Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P. 2d 527, 533 (Utah 
1993) and, State Farm Fire and Casualty v. Forced Aire L.C 2009 UT App 15. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING AFFIDAVITS THAT WERE 
FILED AND SERVED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE RESPONSE 
MEMORANDUM ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF TIMLINESS 
The Trial Court accepted the Affidavit of Joe Scovel and the Appellants' 
Responsive Memorandum in opposition to GM's Motion for Summary Judgment that 
were served at 9:20 a.m. on 02/22/2008, as timely20. Therefore, the Court denied the 
Appellants' substantial rights to due process and erred when it resolved doubts as to 
91 
admissibility in favor of the movant and struck the personal affidavits of Strand and 
Allen (and all exhibits attached thereto) for lack of timeliness when they were also 
timely served on 02/22/2008 at 9:20 a.m. [R. 2215 ffi['s 5-6]. 
Statute of limitations and a wrongful act against Strand were at issue [R. 609-616, 
2708-2712]. The Trial Court erred when it found (i) that a confidential relationship, a 
wrongful act or unjust enrichment was not plead by the Appellants in their Counterclaim 
and adopted GM theory that Strand's constructive trust claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations and (ii) that there were only two possible wrongful acts imparting constructive 
notice Strand; Nupetco's acquisition of the Property at the Citizen's Bank foreclosure 
20
 [R. 2703 at ^ 2, 2214 at % 3 and Tr. R. 4301 at pg 40 lines 22-25 and pg. 41 lines 1-3 ]. 
91 
Doubts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982). 
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sale in 1985 or the 07/21/2000 conveyance of the Property by Nupetco to LFI. 
In their Counterclaim, the Appellants alleged that (i) Strand had allowed his home 
to be titled in the name of GM and its predecessor in interest to hold for Strand's benefit, 
use anc advantage [R. 45 ^19] (ii) that GM was placed as a fiduciary over the property 
[R. 46 T|30], (iii) at the time that Strand agreed that title could be placed in the name of 
GM, both parties understood, knew, acknowledge and affirmed that the property was 
being placed in GM name, in trust, with the complete and clear knowledge and 
understanding that GM was acting as trustee [R. 47 |^34 ] and, (iv) that at the time that 
the instant lawsuit was filed, GM immediately breached its fiduciary duty by attempting 
to deprive Strand of the value of hundreds of thousands of dollars of which the property 
is worth and to dispossess him of the habitation and rest in such property [R. 46 *|31]. 
A fiduciary relationship and a confidential relationship are considered one and the 
same. See First Sec. Bank N.A. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P. 2d 1326, 1332 & n. 18 
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(Utah 1990)" Generally, in a fiduciary relationship, the propeity, interest or authority of 
the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary. Dennison State Bank, 230 Kan. At 640 
P. 2d at 1241 (citation and emphasis omitted). Equity imposes a constructive trust to 
prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud or the violation of a duty imposed 
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and such trust may arise when the 
confidential relationship is abused by the promissor. 
In its Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Strand, and Allen, for failure to comply 
22
 (using the terms interchangeably and citing cases for the proposition that fiduciary 
relationship and confidential relationship are ordinarily convertible terms). 
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with Rule 56(e) or for the reasons stated in GM Motion in Limine [R. 1881-1885, 1888-
1893], GM (improperly) objected to the testimony that explained (i) the facts surrounding 
the transactions, (ii) the parties intent and; (iii) that Nupetco's acquisition of the Property 
at the Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale in 1985 and the July 2000 conveyance of the 
Property by Nupetco to LFI were not wrongful acts imparting constructive notice Strand. 
But, GM did not object to Strand's affidavit at Tf35 [R. 1779] which states: "At no time 
has Petty ever stated to me that he believed that either Nupetco or the plaintiff owned my 
home until August 2007 when I was served the Notice to Quit." 
When a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take advantage of a statute of 
limitations defense until something has occurred to give the beneficiary a "clear 
indication" that a breach or repudiation has occurred, or, alternatively, the circumstances 
must be "such that [the beneficiary] must be charged with knowledge" Walker v. Walker, 
17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P. 2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965). A trust is a form of ownership in which 
legal title to property is vested in a trustee, who has an equitable duty to hold and 
manage it for benefit of beneficiaries. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. County Club 
Mobile Estates Ltd., 632 P. 2d 869 (Utah 1981) and, In re Estate of Flake, 71 P. 3d 589 
(Utah 2003)). Where a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a violation of the trust, it 
constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" calling for the application of the discovery 
rule, Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20. Therefore, by failing to liberally construe the 
Appellant's Answer and Counterclaim and by striking Strand's affidavit at f35 on 
alternate grounds of timeliness, the Court failed to acknowledge material facts submitted 
by Appellants' concerning the statute of limitations governing the Appellants 
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Counterclaim and their Defenses and applied the statute of limitations against Strand 
inequitably and improperly. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's order striking the Feb 22 personal 
Affidavits of Strand and Allen [R. 2215 ffl's 5-6]. The Trial Court abused its discretion 
in striking affidavits that were filed and served concurrently with the responsive 
memorandum. GM had adequate opportunity to respond to the statements in the 
affidavits and no rule prohibited the filing of the affidavits. For the reasons stated above 
with respect to Strand's affidavit at f35 and for the additional reasons discussed herein, 
Strand and Allen's Feb. 22 personal affidavits create issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. Therefore the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING AFFIDAVITS FILED AFTER THE 
INITIAL RESPONSE MEMORANDUM WHERE THE MOVANT HAD 
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATEMENTS IN THE 
AFFIDAVITS AND NO RULE PROHIBITED THE FILING OF THE AFFIDAVITS 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment GM claimed that there was no dispute that 
Nupetco purchased the Property for $190,000 at the (Citizen's Bank) foreclosure sale 
with it's own funds for its own benefit [R.603 f6] and that GM paid the property taxes in 
full for the years 2000 through 2007 using its own funds [R. 606 f21]. These facts were 
clearly disputed and the source of funds was contested [See R. 1839 17-9 and R. 1773-
1775 at f f s 4, 17 and 18]. 
In its Feb 22 Motion to Strike the Feb. 22 affidavit of Strand, GM claimed that 
ft's 4, 17 and 18 to Strand's Affidavit that disputed these facts were vague or incomplete 
and should be rejected [R. 1891-1892]. In response, on Feb 28, the Appellants filed 
memoranda in opposition to the motion to strike [R. 1933 | ana provided supplemental 
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affidavits of Strand [R. 1949, 2002] and Allen [R. 1930] along with affidavits by Charles 
Dooley [R. 2033] and attorney Dan Jackson [2073]. 
GM requested that the Appellants' response to the Motion to Strike the affidavit 
of Strand be filed and served on 02/28/2008 [R. 1897]. Even though the Court did not 
enter GM' proposed order granting it's motions to reduce time for Appellant's response 
[R. 2113], when the affidavits were served on Feb 28 in response to GM' Motion to 
Strike, the next day, on 02/29/2008, GM moved to strike them arguing lack of timeliness 
[R 2066, 2068]. 
GM could not claim they were in anyway prejudiced by the receipt of the 
Supplemental Affidavits of Strand and Allen and the affidavit of Charles Dooley that the 
Appellants' served by hand-delivery on February 28 or the affidavit by Attorney Dan 
Jackson that was sent by way of facsimile the evening of Feb. 28. They were served by 
the deadline requested by GM. 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
determined based on the affidavits and other materials "on file." This Court should 
reverse the Trial Court's order striking the Feb 28 affidavits as untimely. The Trial Court 
abused its discretion in striking affidavits filed after the initial response memorandum 
where GM had adequate opportunity to review and respond to the statements in the 
affidavits and no rule prohibited the filing of the affidavits. Rule 7(c)(1) prohibits the 
filing of additional memoranda beyond the initial memorandum, response, and reply, but 
nothing in the rule prohibits filing additional affidavits. Moreover, the Affidavits (i) were 
timely served in response to GM Motions to Strike and (ii) served concurrently with the 
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Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Strike. 
The Court erred when it did not consider the Feb 28 affidavits but heard GM 
motions to Strike the Appellant's Feb 20, Feb 22 and Feb 28 Affidavits on March 3 in 
conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment. As discussed herein, these 
affidavits create issues of fact. The Trial Court's grant of summary judgment should, 
therefore, also be reversed. 
IV: SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED BECAUSE THE MATERIAL 
FACTS WERE DISPUTED 
On Summary judgment motion, the purpose of affidavits is "only to determine 
whether a material issue of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less 
persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed on the trial of the merits." 
"Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are but only to ascertain 
whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute.24 "it is not the purpose of the 
Summary Judgment procedure to Judge the credibility of the averments or parties, or 
witnesses or the weight of evidence" 25"[I]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to 
dispute the averments of the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact." 26 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes three minimum requirements 
for affidavits supporting a summary judgment motion: (1) the affidavit "be made on 
23
 Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
24
 Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 123, 477 P. 2d 151 (1970). 
25
 Holbrook Co. v. Adams 542 P. 2d 199, 193 (Utah 1975) 
26
 Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
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personal knowledge," (2) set forth facts "admissible in evidence," and (3) "show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters sated therein." Doubts 
should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Summary Judgment is permissible 
"only when the matter is clear; and in case of doubt should be resolved in allowing the 
challenged party the opportunity of at least attempting to prove his right to recover." 28 
"If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party.9'29 "On review of a grant of summary 
judgment to a plaintiff, the inquiry is whether there is any genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law" . Because there were disputed issues of material fact summary judgment could 
not issue in this action by the Trial Court. 
1. The nature of Strand and Petty's relationship, the facts surrounding the 
Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale, the source of funds used and for whose behalf the 
purchase was made, the lease, the parties intent and Strand's occupancy of the home 
without a claim ever being made against him were at issue in this case. See GM's 
Statement of Facts at at f f s 2, 6,17, f 8 and f 10 [R. 603-604] and the Affidavit of Petty 
atffs2-9[R.969-972]. 
27
 Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982). 
28
 Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 1977). 
29
 Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 975 P.2d 464 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted, brackets by 
the court). 
30
 Thorncockv. Cook 604 P.d 934 (Utah 1979) 
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a) The Trial Court erred when it resolved doubts as to admissibility in 
favor of the movant and struck the affidavit testimony of Strand's former wife Lois 
Williams at f 4 second, third and fourth sentences for lack of foundation [R. at 4301Tr. 
pg. 17 lines 2-25, pg. 18 lines 1-4, pg. 20 lines 4-6], despite the objection of both pro-se 
Appellants31 and despite the Appellants9 "newly engaged" counsels oral motion for leave 
to correct deficiencies and his objection that Ms. Williams was stating her involvement 
and understanding of the agreement, her understanding based on discussions with the 
parties, and her involvement in the transaction, which was within her own personal 
knowledge which she, as an owner of the property and as a signatory to the lease, has the 
ability as a witness to testify to at trial [R. 4301 Tr. pg. 9 lines 6-25 and pg. 10 lines 1-7]. 
If the Trial Court had admitted this testimony [R. 1814 at ^4]: 
Lois (Strand) Williams: " I can however attest that by agreement with 
Michael, Neuman Petty purchased the mortgage held on our home from Citizen's 
Bank and Michael and I signed a lease with Neuman on the house in the mid 
eighties that was somehow involved with our assets in the oil field. There was 
never any rent or lease payments made or requested. It was understood between 
myself, Michael and Neuman that Neuman was just protecting our home and that 
Neuman's company, Nupetco did not in reality own it." 
, there would have been a material fact that would have precluded Summary Judgment 
because this testimony contradicts GM's statement of facts at fflf's 6-8 and 10[R. 603-
604] and Petty's Affidavit at f f s 5, 6, 8 and 9 [R. 970 ] that was relied on by GM in 
That f 4 second sentence is based on her own personal knowledge she was married to 
Strand and knows what she understood and f4 fourth and fifth sentence that she is 
testifying to facts based on her own personal knowledge and her state of mind which is 
relevant and an exception to the hearsay rule as statements describing or explaining the 
event while the declarant was perceiving the event [R. 1914-1921] 
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Support of it's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should reverse the Trial 
Court's order striking Affidavit of Lois Williams at f4 second, third and fourth sentences. 
Her testimony presented competent admissible evidence based on personal knowledge 
and created issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion when it did not interpret the affidavit liberally and or when it denied 
the Appellants' "newly engaged" counsel's oral motion to correct any deficiencies. 
b) The Trial Court found that the source of funds that were used to purchase the 
home at the Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale was contested and erred when it not only 
weighed Strands testimony [R. 2704 f 6] but, resolved doubts as to admissibility in favor 
of the movant and struck the exhibits and affidavit testimony of Strand at fflf's 17-18 [R. 
1775] that: 
"by mutual agreement between Neuman Petty, myself, Lhor Livingston (Senior 
Vice President of the Citizen's Bank) and Gary Harris (President of The Citizens Bank) 
for my benefit, Nupetco paid $190,000, the amount due to the Citizens Bank on my 
home, with my money, at my instruction. In preparation for this transaction I assigned a 
secured judgment in my favor to Nupetco that I had against Leland Martineau in an 
amount over $522,796.72 plus interest (The security being a new automobile dealership, 
building and land in burley Idaho (Magic Valley Motors.) See Exhibit F.)" [Exhibit F- R. 
1797-1799]32. 
This testimony provided express statements of fact based on solid foundation and 
a personal knowledge of the affiant and is corroborated by the Affidavit of attorney Dan 
Jackson at f f s 10 through 18 [R. 2075-2076], Strand's supplemental affidavit [R. 1952, 
32
 In paragraph 19 to his 02/22/2008 Affidavit, Strand also testified that it was his memory 
that there actually was not a foreclosure sale and provided a letter dated September 5, 
1985 from Wayne Petty to the title company to show that the $190,000 was a known 
figure, agreed to in advance, and prior to the sale. See also f^ f's 16-17 to attorney Dan 
Jacksons affidavit at Addendum at 6 and Strand's Deposition testimony referenced in 
herein. 
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19531Hf's 4-5] and by, i) the Appellants answers to GM's Requests for Admissions and, 
ii) Strands Deposition testimony that GM filed in support of it's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (referenced herein). 
If the Trial Court had admitted Strand's testimony there would have been a 
material fact that precluded Summary Judgment because this testimony contradicts GM's 
statement of facts fflj's 6-8 and 10 [R. 603-604] and Petty's affidavit at ff's 5, 6, 8 and 9 
[R.970] that was relied on by GM in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
Court should reverse the Trial Court's order striking Affidavit of Strand at f^lf's 17-18. 
The testimony creates issues of fact precluding summary judgment. 
c) The Appellants provided testimony by attorney Dan Jackson who 
has been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1979 [R. 2073 - 2091]. The next day, GM 
moved to strike this affidavit arguing (i) failure to conform with Rule 56(e), (ii) lack of 
timeliness and (iii) failure to disclose witness testimony [R. 2068-2072]. Dan Jackson 
was designated as a witness by both parties [R. 253, 260]33. At the hearing held on 
March 3, 2007 the Court struck the affidavit for lack of timeliness because it did not 
make it to his desk in time to prepare for the hearing [R. 4301 (03/03/08) Tr. pg. 46 lines 
1-5 and 2215 f7]. In spite of these facts the order striking this affidavit states that it was 
stricken on the grounds listed in GM's motion to strike [R. 2215 f7]. However, during 
the September 3, 2008 telephonic hearing conducted on the Appellants' Rule 59 motion 
33
 Prior to their receipt of the Affidavit the Appellants' did not know what Mr. Jackson 
would testify to. When they received his affidavit they amended their disclosure of 
witnesses [R. 2057, 2060] in the exact same manner as GM [R. 1128] but, irrespective, 
at the hearing held on March 3, 2008 the court stated that failure to disclose witnesses 
does not preclude a witness from submitting an affidavit [R. 4301 pg. 7 lines 1-5]. 
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the Court reviewed this affidavit and found that it is mainly conclusory, contains legal 
argument and would not have been helpful to the Court when it considered the Motion 
for Summary Judgment [R. 4304 (09/03/08) Tr. pg. 45 lines 10-20]. 
If the Court had admitted Dan Jackson's testimony at Tflf's 1 through 18 [R. 2073-
2091, Addendum at 6], there would have been a material fact that precluded Summary 
Judgment because this testimony contradicts GM's statement of facts f2, f6 (second 
line), f7,118, and [^10 [R. 602-604] and the Affidavit of Petty at ffif's 5, 6, 8, and 9 [R. 
970] that was relied upon by GM in support of it's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's order striking the Affidavit of attorney 
Dan Jackson. The affidavit provided express statements of fact based on solid foundation 
and a personal knowledge of the affiant and clearly creates issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment. 
d) The Trial Court erred when it found that Strand's adverse possession claim 
was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that Strand was unable to demonstrate any 
seven-year period when Strand possessed the Property adversely and paid all the taxes 
thereon [R. 2702 ]f7]. The validity of the lease was disputed but irrespective, because of 
the close relationship between Strand and Petty, the prescriptive running is not affected. 
These facts must be construed in favor of Strand. Even after consideration of their close 
relationship it is asserted that Petty thought of Strand as a family member34. The lease 
does not destroy Strand's adverse possession of the property. He has both a claim to the 
property as an occupying claimant and a possessory right which was open; notorious, 
34
 [R. 1773 Tf6, 1835 JJ, 1829 ^ 5, 1833^8, 1753-1754^3] 
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adverse and hostile to the now claimed interests of Petty for in excess of 20 years [R. 
1772-1773 f2, f5, 1848].Strand testified that he made valuable improvements to the 
property and that he paid the taxes for 28 years (1976-2004)35. The lease if it were valid, 
would not act as a bar to the running of a prescriptive period with persons of close 
relationships {See Totman v. Malloy 431 Mass. 143, 725 N.E. 2d 1045 9 Mass., 2000)). 
Because of the relationship of the parties laches would bar GM's claim. 
2. A Deed can be shown to be held in trust, Haws v. Jensen, 209 P. 2d 229, 
(Utah 1949). GM sought to establish the fact that Nupetco owned the property from 1985 
until 2000. The fact that Nupetco allowed the Strand's to occupy the property pursuant to 
the 1985 lease and then at the will of, and permission of, Nupetco. The fact that the 
property was sold to LFI, and the fact that GM became the owner in 2004 as a result of a 
Trustee's Sale and Trustee's Deed, based on the Appellants prior testimony in matters 
unrelated to the present litigation [R.6031J9, 604-605 If 's 13-18,]. 
In support of this theory GM relied on the legal argument put forth in it's Motion 
in Limine to preclude the Appellants' from disputing these alleged facts and, on a case 
that is diametrically against them - Schroeder v. Pratt, 21 Utah 176, 185-186, 60 P. 512 
(Utah 1900) ("Where a transaction is tainted with fraud, as between the parties to it, a 
court will not assist either, but will leave them in the position in which they have placed 
themselves."). As a preliminary matter, in Schroder v. Pratt, the court held that if 
evidence is erroneously excluded by the Court below in the record, the Appellate Court 
35
 [1773 f f s 3-4, 1781-1786 and 1951-1952 f s 3, 13-19,77-89] 
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can consider it. Secondly, the Court held that if a mortgage lacks consideration and is 
fraudulently entered into, the Court will not enforce it but instead will leave the parties in 
the position that they have placed themselves. Because the 1985 lease and the 07/21/2000 
mortgage between LFI and GM were based on fraud, the Court should not have used that 
lease or mortgage to change anyone's interests. The Trial Court should have left the 
parties in the position that they placed themselves; with GM holding legal title and Strand 
in possession of the property and holding equitable title. 
The error with the Trial Court's ruling is that (i) it did not hear the Motion in 
Limine [R. 2702] and, (ii) the blatant failure by GM to establish that "he [Neuman Petty 
and or Nupetco, and or GM]...has done something or omitted to do something in reliance 
on [Mr. Strand's and or Ms. Allen's] testimony in the earlier proceeding[s]," much less 
that he did not have "equal knowledge of the facts." GM never, in any way, pled or 
claimed reliance on the Appellants prior testimony - not in it's Motion in Limine, not in 
its Motion for Summary Judgment, not in Neuman Petty's supporting affidavit, nor in 
any other pleading or affidavit. Nor is it possible to infer reliance by GM because there 
are no facts, actual or alleged, anywhere in this case, from which reliance may be 
inferred. For this reason alone, the Trial Court committed reversible error. 
The Trial Court erred at the hearing held on March 3, 2008 when it adopted GM's 
theory that the affidavits of Strand and Allen should be read in the context of the legal 
arguments that each side was making [R. Tr. pg. 50 lines 9-25] rather than determine 
whether a material issue of fact exists. The purpose of affidavits is "only to determine 
whether a material issue of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less 
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persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed on the trial of the merits." By 
adopting GM' legal argument and striking the affidavit testimony submitted by the 
Appellants and others in opposition to GM statement of facts f 2 and Jf s 6 through 22, 
the Court (i) precluded the Appellants from asserting their defenses of equitable and 
promissory estoppel (ii) ignored relevant issues of material fact and; (iii) gave no 
deference to the pro-se litigants including the right afforded by the Utah Rules of 
evidence to explain any perceived inconsistency in their testimony Utah R. Evid. 613(b). 
Had the Court admitted Strand's affidavit testimony and exhibits at Iffl's 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 
13, 15, 17 - 30, 34, 35, 37 [R. 1773-1780 / Exhibits 1781-1809] and; Allen's affidavit 
testimony and exhibits [R. 1753-1757 at fflf's 2-19/ Exhibits 1558-1770], it would have 
found that (i) there was no consideration (ii) that all the parties understood and agreed 
that the home was being held in trust for Strand for a period of over 25 years, (iii) that a 
confidential relationship between Strand and Petty existed (iv) that Nupetco, LFI (its 
creditor) and GM had been put on notice as to Strand's claims to such property and were 
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not bone fide purchasers (v) that repudiation of the trust did not occur until the filing 
of this eviction action and; (vi) that the Appellants relied on Petty5 s promises and 
assurances to them and were induced to act a certain way. 
By striking Strand and Allen's testimony the Trial Court failed to observe the 
doctrine of equitable and promissory estoppel and erroneously found that Strand's claims 
36
 Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
37
 Chadwick v. Arnold 34 Utah 48, 95 P. 527 (Utah 1908) 
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to the Property were barred by the Statute of Frauds. The Trial Court committed error 
when it accepted GM's alleged facts and refiised to allow Appellants to present their set 
of facts, Winegar v. Froerer et.al, 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991). Since the Appellants5 
testimony involves the facts surrounding the transactions and the parties intent, the Trial 
Court's rejection of their version of the facts concerning motive and intent, is in 
repudiation of their credibility as well. Weighing parties' credibility is also improper -
Masters v. Worsley, 111 P. 2d 499 (Utah Ct. App, 1989) - and is another error by the 
Trial Court requiring this Court to reverse the Trial Court's grant of Summary Judgment. 
The Appellants' prior testimony and statements made by others in prior unrelated 
actions did not constitute judicial admissions and their Affidavits in opposition to GM's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Strand's deposition testimony not only offered proof 
of a "long-established relationship of trust" between the Appellants and Petty but 
established the equitable and promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds. 
A. Utah courts define equitable estoppel as "conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." United Am. Life Ins. Co, 
v. Zion's FirstNat'lBank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982).38 
B. Promissory estoppel has been extended in a limited form to cases concerned 
with the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds, where the promise as to future 
38
 see also Blackfs Law Dictionary 571 (7th ed. 1999) (defining equitable estoppel as "[a] 
defensive doctrine preventing one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, 
through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person 
to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in some 
way". 
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conduct, constitutes the intended abandonment of an existing right of the promissor. 
Easton v. Wycoff, 295 P. 2d 332 (Utah 1956). See Ferich v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 100 P. 
3d 1200 (Utah 2004): 
"To establish the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds, the acts 
and conduct of the promissor must so clearly manifest an intention that he will not 
assert the statute that permit him to do so would be to work a fraud upon the other 
party." 
The Appellants' Affidavits in opposition to Summary Judgment; Strand at R, 
1777-1780 Iff s 27-30, 34, 35, 37 and Allen at R. 1754-1756 1HJ4-19 satisfy the elements 
of equitable and promissory estoppel. They allege that: Petty misrepresented the nature 
and scope of the LFI transaction and GM's foreclosure sale as to the present and the 
future, that the Appellants reasonably relied his representations and that the 
representations were clear and material and made in an attempt to induce the Appellants 
to agree and act in a certain way and that by filing this eviction action, Petty changed 
positions to the Appellants' detriment. 
GM never addressed those points, by sworn testimony, nor in it's Motion for 
Summary Judgment mor it's in reply in Support of it's Motion. Nor is it possible to infer 
that GM denied Petty made these promises and assurances to them because there are no 
facts, actual or alleged, anywhere in this case, that these representations were not made. 
Therefore, the Trial Court erred by striking the Appellants' affidavits and granting 
Summary Judgment against them and by denying their discovery motions in reliance on 
that prior testimony. See Orvis v. Johnson 111 P. 3d 600 (UT 2008). The grant of 
summary judgment should therefore be reversed. 
3. The Trial Court adopted the most extreme view it could possibly adopt 
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against Strand in viewing the facts. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits should be looked at in light favorable to 
position of party opposing summary judgment. Facts are to be viewed in light most 
favorable to the one opposing summary judgment, Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias^ 
116 P. 3d 323 (Utah 2005). Rather than utilizing this "perspective" the Trial Court did the 
opposite. For Example: 
A. In its Summary Judgment Order, the Trial Court found that: "Strand 
claims that Petty breached the 1982 Agreement by having Nupetco purchase the Property 
at foreclosure sale when Petty was, according to Strand, contractually obligated to pay off 
the Citizens Bank Trust Deed and thereby leave the Property in Strand's name. Strand 
Depo. at 106."[R. 2709 Tf4] - Whereas; the actual testimony given by Strand states that 
Petty did not breach the 1982 agreement. That Petty ultimately did what he said he would 
do - satisfy his obligation to the joint venture and protect Strands home, his parents home 
and his parents' rental property. That Petty worked with the Citizen's Bank and made 
business decisions for the benefit of Strand and Petty without the input of Strand. That 
Petty's decision to let the Property go to sale and purchase it at foreclosure in the name of 
Nupetco at the amount set by Strand ($190,000) was for the benefit of Strand and Petty 
and that Strand was fine with the arrangement.39 The 1982 Joint Venture "Agreement" is 
the best evidence of its content [R. 652] and does not distinguish where or how Petty's 
39
 [See Strands Depo. at 103 lines 24-25 [R. 626], 106 lines 8-25 [R. 627], 108 lines 12-
25 [R. 628], pg. 109 lines 1-2 [R. 629], pg. 120 lines 13-25 [R. 630], 122 lines 1-25 [R. 
632], R. 123 lines 1-25 [R. 633], 124 lines 1-4 [634], 126 lines 8-25 [R. 636], 127 lines 1-
25 [R637] and 128 lines 1-25 [R. 638] and 129 lines 1-25 [R. 639]. 
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approximate $750,000 contribution to the joint venture would be spent. The continual 
characterization by GM during Strand's deposition and in support of its motion for 
summary judgment that the Agreement called for specific performance by Nupetco on 
specific obligations is erroneous. 
B. In its Summary Judgment Order* the Trial Court found that GM's statement 
o f facts HI 7 that relied on Ralph Petty's supporting testimony at f 8 [R. 909-Exhibit 927-
928] was not disputed and, "In the alternative to striking of Strand's Affidavit, the Court 
accepted at face value Strand's insistence that he "understood exactly what he was 
signing" when he said under oath that Nupetco conveyed the Subject Property to Log 
Furniture on 07/21/2000 and Golden received the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note on the 
Subject Property." [R. 2706 at % 17] - Whereas; the actual testimony provided by Strand's 
affidavit at states: 
"At the request of Petty, I signed an affidavit on August 1, 2003. In that 
Affidavit I testified that the property located at 1199 South 1500 East Bountiful 
Utah (my home) was owned by me before September 5, 2003. I understood 
exactly what I was signing, this statement was correct, and I believed and believe 
that regardless of Log Furnitures and plaintiffs involvement that I always have 
and still do own my home, the Property." [R. 1778 ^[30]. 
There is absolutely no foundation for Ralph Petty's allegation that he had made a 
mistake in drafting Strands 08/01/2003 affidavit and that if Strand had caught his 
mistake he would have corrected the date from September 5, 2003 to September 5, 1985. 
Strand objected to Ralph's testimony and unless there is a claim that Strand directly told 
Ralph Petty that Strand agreed that a mistake had been made, Ralph Petty's conclusion 
would not be admissible. It is an unsubstantiated conclusion. Ralph Petty's personal 
beliefs as to why Strand did not take or took certain actions do not constitute admissible 
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evidence, See Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P. 2w 747, 748 (Utah 1985). Additionally, at 
the time that Ralph Petty prepared the affidavit for Strand he was representing Strand's 
interests [R. 1778 ffii's 29-30, 1756ffij's 18-19] and, Ralph Petty certified that he mailed 
the affidavit to opposing counsel (LFFs creditor) three days before it was even produced 
and signed by Strand. 
Clearly the 08/01/2003 affidavit raises genuine issues of material fact and gave 
notice to MHS that Strand believed on 08/01/2003 that he owned the home and brings 
into question how could Ralph Petty's affidavit be accepted by the Court in a motion for 
summary judgment while all of the pro-se Appellant's affidavits or portions thereof that 
create issues of fact, were stricken. 
C In its Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that: "Moreover, 
Defendants: Admit that Michael Strand has not at any time conveyed his interests, 
equitable title and beneficial ownership to Neuman Petty or his alter ego's [sic] Nupetco 
Associates and Neuman Petty" [Footnote omitted][R. 2708 f3] - Whereas; the actual 
Response submitted by the Appellants in response to GM Interrogatory No. 1, was as 
follows [R. 659-670]: 
"Deny. Pursuant to Neuman Petty's contribution to the November 16, 1982 joint 
Venture Partnership Agreement whereby part of Neuman Petty et afs contribution was to 
pay off the mortgages to Michael Strand's home, Michael Strand's parents Pages Lane 
home and Michael Strand's parents Dexter Street property; to protect Michael Strand's 
interests in and to among other things, his home, "the Property," upon agreement and 
mutual understanding between, Neuman Petty and Lhor Livingston, for Michael Strand's 
benefit, Citizen's bank conveyed title to Nupetco Associates, Neuman Petty's alter ego, 
upon payment of $190,000, the amount due to Citizen's Bank on Michael Strands home, 
the Property. Admit that Michael Strand has not at any time conveyed his interests, 
equitable title and beneficial ownership to Neuman Petty or his alter ego's Nupetco 
Associates and GM. It was understood with complete and clear knowledge between the 
parties that although Neuman Petty and his alter ego's Nupetco Associates and 
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subsequently GM took bare legal title, that they held the Property in trust for the benefit 
of Michael Strand." 
D. The Court struck the Affidavit of Joe Scovel and the exhibits attached 
thereto, for failure to conform with Rule 702 [R.2214] and would not take the 
Assumption [R. 1686 ]; the disclaimer that was signed by Allen and Petty (that GM also 
filed it in support of their motion for Summary Judgment [R. 691] and did not dispute 
it's authenticity [R. 4301 pg. 37 lines 21-22) or the letter from John Pitchar 1803-1804 
(attached to Strand's affidavit) into account even though they demonstrate exceptions to 
title and the parties knowledge of Strands claims, including LandMark Title. 
E. The Trial Court allowed GM to supplement the record with additional 
deposition testimony by Strand that GM claimed completely demolishes any chance of 
success with a confidential relationship claim [R. Tr. 121 lines 13-15] - Whereas; the 
actual testimony submitted by GM states that Strand allowed Petty to direct his business 
activities and make business decisions for the benefit of Strand and Petty without the 
input of Strand [R. 2187 - 2194 Depo at 476 lines 21-25 and 477 lines 1-25]. 
It is impermissible in determining a motion for summary judgment to indulge 
inferences and speculation adverse to the party opposing summary judgment as the Trial 
Court did herein. The Trial Court erred when it edited and misinterpreted Strand's 
affidavit testimony, the Appellants' Answer to GM's Request for Admission No. 1, and 
Strand's deposition testimony. By adopting GM interpretations of the testimony rather 
than look to the actual statements, which create issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment, the Summary Judgment was inappropriate and should be reversed. This Court 
should hold that Strand's Affidavit testimony, the Appellant's Answer to GM Request for 
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Admission No. 1 and Strand's Deposition testimony created genuine disputes of material 
fact that preclude summary judgment. The Trial Court should be reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $113,301.15 WAS AGAINST 
CONTROLLING LAW AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
On the record on Wednesday, 03/05/2008, the Trial Court approved GM's request 
for attorney's fee's pursuant to §78-36-10.3 but, reserved ruling on GM's contention that 
the Appellants' Counterclaim is without merit and was not asserted in good faith and that 
it should be awarded attorney fees and costs for its defense against the Counterclaim 
pursuant to Utah Code §78-27-5640. Thereafter, James Swindler submitted his affidavit 
for fee's which he supplemented on May 7, 200841. The Affidavits made no attempt to 
apportion and requested legal fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $113, 301.15 
and spanned a period of approximately 8 months that covered almost every business day 
from August 21 through May 6,2008 (an average of $758.50 per day). 
It is well established in Utah law that "Generally, a party is entitled to attorney 
fees only as provided by contract or statute." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, et at., 830 P. 
2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Utah Code §78-36-10.3 only provides "for reasonable attorney 
fees" incurred in an unlawful detainer action which is an action to remove a tenant from 
possession and is not similar to a quiet title action. Pearce v. Shurtz 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P. 
2d 442 (Utah 1954). Therefore, the Trial Court erred when it adopted GM's position that 
it had no obligation to apportion its attorney fees and that it was entitled to attorneys fees 
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 [R. 4301 Tr. pg. 139 lines 2-25, 140 lines 1-14] 
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 [R. 2233, 2943 (objection - 2358,2354, 2378, 2350 / response 2512/ hearing 4302)] 
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for the work relating to its Complaint and the work relating to the Appellants' 
Counterclaim under Utah Code §78-36-10.3. 
The duty to apportion as set forth in Sine at 269-270, ensures that attorney fees are 
awarded only to the extent authorized by Utah law. The trial court has no discretion to 
"award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to 
separate claims and/or parties." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P. 2d 305, 3017 (Utah 1998). 
Utah appellate courts have continually enforced the duty to apportion attorney fees. See 
Foote, et al. v. Clark, et al, 962 P. 2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (repeating 3 - element duty as 
set forth in Sine). In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a fee award may be 
denied entirely if the party fails to apportion them. In Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 
2004 UT 28, f36, 94 P. 3d 193, the Court stated that rule as follows: "In order to recover 
any attorney at all, the prevailing party must apportion or separate out the recoverable 
fees from the non-recoverable ones." Id. f36. 
An award of attorney fees made without adequate evidence to support it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled by Supreme Court. Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n. 657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982). In Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Sur., 854 P. 2d 527, 534 (Utah 1993), the district court failed to specifically 
find bad faith, but simply awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court in Broadwater 
reversed on the award of attorney fees, and stated, "without making the appropriate 
findings as to the elements of 78-27-56, we cannot determine the basis of the award." 
In ruling that the Appellants were responsible for GM's attorney fees on all 
aspects of this case under Utah Code §78-36-10.3, without a finding of bad faith, the 
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Trial Court made no investigation into: (1) the 37 ex parte contacts between GM and the 
court including an ongoing dialogue with the Court's law clerk [R. 2249-2266] who 
openly displayed his hostility to the Appellant's position during the Summary Judgment 
hearing held on 03/05/2008 [R. 2545-2546, 25753; (ii) the fact that before this suit was 
initiated, GM, its counsel James Swindler, and Wayne Petty knew the scope and extent 
of Strand's claims by having received a draft copy of Strand's Third District Complaint 
against Petty and Nupetco and Strand's personal and legal information nor the 177 
contacts and discussions between Mr. Swindler and Wayne Petty [R. 2249-2266] before 
he became co-counsel (iii) the impropriety of Wayne Petty's appearance as co-counsel in 
this case, against Strand, who was a client of Wayne Petty's, that Wayne Petty 
represented in aspects of the 1982 joint venture executed between Strand and his entities 
including B.L Associates and Petty and his entities including Nupetco and the Citizen's 
Bank litigation - both of which involve the ownership of the Property. Even though this 
conflict was raised on 06/30/2008 [R. at pg. 17 lines 5-25 and 18 lines 1-12] (iv) why the 
Appellants were summoned to defend against one set of issues and then suddenly 
confronted with a new and different set of issues at the October 24, 2007 hearing and 
then again through GM's motion for summary judgment (iv) nor the discrepancy between 
Mr. Swindler's claim that his attorney fees for the case would be $10,000 [R.4299 Tr. pg. 
6 lines 8-10, 24-25 and pg. 7 line 1] and the $113, 301.12 he subsequently submitted. The 
Trial Court stated that the numbers were striking, but, he approved them and stated that 
he approved GM' strategy and that he understood that the pro-se litigants complicated 
this case and complicated discovery [R. 4302 Tr, pg. 29 lines 13-23]. 
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Because Summary Judgment could not issue in this action the grant of attorney's 
fees must be reversed. Because an action to quiet title does not provide for attorney's fees 
by statute or rule, and there was no apportionment, the award of attorney fees must also, 
be reversed. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANTS RULE 59 MOTION 
The Trial Court precluded the Appellants from discovering evidence and 
information regarding the 1982 joint venture between Strand and his entities and Neuman 
Petty and his entities and any accounting concerning it or profits thereof. All of the 
argument in GM' Motion for Summary Judgment and, in part, it's Motions to Strike 
portions of Allen and Strand's testimony concerning the Trust, Constructive Trust and 
the statute of limitations, relate to GM's Motion in Limine where based on GM's 
argument, Strand and his claims are not relevant to this case. At the hearing held on 
GM's Motion for Summary Judgment the Court specifically indicated that it did not 
intend to make any ruling that would affect the Third District Court Case presently before 
Judge Iwasaki (Third District Court case no. 070915796). In spite of this fact, the Trial 
Court found that Strand's claims to the Property based on the 1982 Agreement were 
barred by the statute of limitations as of September 1991, at the latest [R. 4299 Tr. pg. 
130, lines 2-9, 2709 f4 last line]. In this case, neither Appellant had actual or constructive 
notice that GM would claim ownership of the property until the filing of this eviction 
action. Petty did not repudiate the joint venture that held the house in trust, until 2005 
[R.2606]. It is evident that the intent of the Summary Judgment motion filed by GM was 
to preclude prosecution of the Third District Case. The Trial Court's rulings constitute 
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irregularities concerning the statute of limitations governing the Appellant's 
Counterclaim. Clearly the Court abused its discretion by taking notice of the two possible 
wrongful acts against Strand that were alleged by GM and by not taking notice of the 
wrongful act alleged by the Appellants. These irregularities denied Mr. Strand a fair 
hearing. Both GM's and Petty's specific allegations about the facts surrounding the 
Citizen's Bank foreclosure and the parties' intent are contrary to the facts as stated by 
Wayne Petty, Nupetco and Strand in the Citizen's Bank litigation. The Court abused its 
discretion by not taking notice of these source documents that substantiated the 
Appellants' argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it can be determined that issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment did exist. This Court should accordingly reverse the Trial Court's 
rulings and hold that Strand's deposition testimony, the Appellants' answers to GM's 
requests for admissions, the Appellants' pleadings and the Affidavits of Lois Williams, 
attorney Dan Jackson, Strand, Allen and all other affidavits and exhibits referenced 
herein presented admissible evidence so there were disputes of material fact that 
precluded summary judgment. Neither Appellant had actual or constructive notice that 
GM would claim ownership of the home until the filing of this eviction action. Petty did 
not repudiate the joint venture that held the house in trust until 2005[R. 2606]. 
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